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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the relationship between the sunk cost effect and 
ambiguity in investment situations. Starting from the sensemaking approach and the decision 
dilemma theory, our hypothesis is that a sunk cost affected decision can be “constructively" 
rational in ambiguous environments in the sense that decision makers have the opportunity, 
through actions, to enact an environment that allows an effective utilization of their sunk 
costs. We called this attitude “constructive rationality”. We conducted an experiment 
(N=353) in which we manipulated the degree of ambiguity of the typical investment scenario 
proposed in the seminal work of Arkes and Blumer (n. 3A), analyzed the willingness to 
continue in each scenario, and the driving forces behind positive responses. Our results 
demonstrate that ambiguity favors further commitment of resources allowing a constructive 
interpretation of the future. Implications of these results and directions for future research are 
discussed. 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: sunk cost; escalation of commitment; ambiguity; retrospective rationality; 
sensemaking; enactment; constructive rationality. 
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Irrational Perseverant or Unrecoverable Optimist? 
A Normative Reading of Sunk Cost Affected Behaviors 
 
Classic rational choice theory states that decision makers, when deciding, should 
choose among a set of alternative courses of action in order to reach goals that are ranked 
according to a well defined evaluation criterion. In this sense, courses of action must be 
consistent to the decision maker’s objectives and preferences and, moreover, such 
consistency must be directed from preferences to actions (Katz & Rosen, 1994). According to 
this traditional model, the primacy of preferences leads them to be considered as an 
exogenous and a-priori independent variable. For instance, in economic decision making 
theories, the criterion used to judge consequences has to be consistent with the so called 
subjective expected utility (SEU) function that evaluates each consequence on the basis of its 
incremental cost and benefit. 
A major corollary of this view implies that unrecoverable past investments should not 
be considered in the decision process since their marginal cost is null. As clearly said by 
Johnstone (2003, p. 209): “For decision-making purposes, sunk costs are strictly irrelevant. 
This is a law of economic logic justified by the argument that because no action (current or 
future) can avert or reduce a sunk cost, no sunk cost can be attributed to or have any 
relevance to current or future action”. As a consequence “By definition, any sunk cost related 
to some course of action is a constant, whether or not one chooses to continue the action” 
(Garland & Newport, 1991, p. 56). Past is past, and it can no longer influence the desirability 
of future consequences (Wang & Zang, 2001). 
While during the last decades this paradigm has been proposed and accepted as 
normatively correct, a series of experiments confirm that when decision makers should 
decide whether to continue investing in an ongoing project, they are heavily influenced by the 
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amount of “time, money or effort already spent” (Arkes & Blumer, 1985, p. 124). Such 
influence is twofold. On the one hand, when decision makers evaluate the net benefit of 
different alternatives, they tend to consider past unrecoverable costs associated to each as a 
factor that lowers the utility of the other alternatives. That is, “…paying for the right to use a 
good will increase the rate at which the good will be utilized ceteris paribus. This hypothesis 
will be referred to as the sunk cost effect.” (Thaler, 1994, p. 11). A typical example is the one 
proposed by Arkes and Blumer (1985) in which respondents have to choose between two 
different holydays they already paid for (and that are not refundable) since they are told that 
the two trips occur in the same period; typically, respondents tend to choose the trip that 
displays a greater sunk cost even if the other behavior is more desirable. 
On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that sunk costs do not limit their effect to 
the retrospective evaluation of net utility; they also constraint future actions in the sense that 
decision makers will tend to invest additional resources in the initiated investment i.e. they 
tend to “throw good money after bad money” (Garland, 1990). A typical experiment, widely 
analyzed in this work, proposes to decision makers an investment project that, once reached 
90% of budgeted expenditures, faces a negative feedback signaling, from the perspective of 
researchers, a failing course of action. Nonetheless, the majority of respondents commit the 
remaining budget to such evident failure. 
In sum, as we can see from figure 1, sunk costs seem to both retrospectively constraint 
the evaluation of costs and benefits (sunk cost effect), and prospectively, generate additional 
commitments to the failing course of action (irrational escalation) (Staw, 1976). From the 
perspective of the classic decision theory, both behaviors are to be considered as irrational (a 
maladaptive economic behavior) because they do not evaluate consequences of alternatives 
only considering future benefits and costs (Katz & Rosen, 1994). That is, their behavior is 
retrospective and, thus, not consistent to the normative prospective model (Conlon & McLean 
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Parks, 1987). Scholars of such irrational reading use psychological hypotheses to explain why 
decision makers find so hard to “extract themselves from losing situations” (Moon, 2001, p. 
104). For instance, the most known arguments are the “don’t waste” rule (Arkes & Blumer, 
1985; Arkes, 1996), the self-justification explanation (Staw, 1981; Staw & Ross 1989; 
Brockner, 1992) the prospect theory effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; White, 1986), the 
project completion (Garland & Conlon, 1998), and the mental accounting explanation 
(Thaler, 1985). 
Other schools of thought take a different position in respect to the presumed 
irrationality of such behaviors. These authors question the generality of empirical studies due 
to the fact that subjects were not provided with estimations of future returns and/or 
alternatives (Conlon & McLean Parks, 1987; Tan & Yates, 1995; Heat, 1995). In general, 
they are more prudent in stating that in real decision contexts a “past looking” attitude can be 
judged as a wrong decision strategy. For some, when facing a negative feedback, the lack of 
information or clarity about past trends pushes the decision maker to an “attendant” approach 
in order to gather additional information, have a proper framing of the decision and avoid 
mistakes (McCain, 1986; Northcraft & Neale, 1986; Chi & Nystrom, 1995; Singer & Singer, 
1986). Similarly, for others, an additional marginal investment is a way to stimulate an 
environmental reaction and gather more feedback about the current course of action. From 
this perspective “…delaying exit decisions under equivocal conditions is not necessarily 
erroneous; it may be the case that investors are waiting to gather more information about the 
situation” (Hantula & DeNicolis Bragger, 1999, p. 437). Others stress the abstractness of the 
decision context proposed in the experiments since questions are typically of a “one shot” 
type: respondents have to decide basing their decision on a one step historical evidence; that 
is, the current negative feedback. On the contrary, these researchers sustain that a more 
extended historical cue enables more “prospective” evaluations (Goltz, 1992, 1993; 
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Drummond, 1998; O'Flaherty & Komaki, 1992). In general those critics do not disagree with 
the fundamental assumption underlying the sunk cost theory but rather with the validity of the 
experimental evidences. That is, decision makers should be normatively prospective, while 
retrospection is a comprehensible sub-optimal strategy in situations characterized by 
uncertainty (where information about the decision context is lacking). 
Another school of thought in this area that falls under the notion of decision dilemma 
theory, proposes a critic from a quite different point of view (Bowen, 1987; Hantula, 1992; 
Nortcraft & Wolf 1984; Hantula & DeNicolis Bragger, 1999). Their contribution opens sunk 
costs studies to the wider research inquiry on sensemaking and organizational epistemology, 
throwing a constructivist light onto these supposedly irrational behaviors. Such works imply 
a critic that goes at the very heart of the positivistic epistemological assumptions inherited by 
the sunk cost theory from the classic decision making paradigm (Drummond, 1998). In 
addition, they criticize the assumption by which the normative rational model must be 
prospective while proposing retrospective reasoning as a quite correct decision criterion when 
the actor is facing particular environmental situations. In particular Bowen commented that 
“because equivocal decision situations often lack generally acceptable decision criteria, and 
because of the nature of enactments in organizations, choice of strategy depends upon … the 
definition of the problem … as well as the outcome(s) of prior strategies”. (1987, p. 58). 
More precisely, this school of thought underlined not only that previous experiments made to 
evaluate such irrationality were characterized by a strong degree of ambiguity; rather, they 
affirmed that this characteristic doesn’t allow a classic prospective decision making process, 
and thus participants cannot be considered irrational. 
Starting from these considerations, our work is focused on the notion of ambiguity and 
its influence on decision situations. In fact, as we propose, the rationality of a course of action 
in ambiguous situations is heavily dependant from the decision maker’s commitment in 
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pursuing his beliefs and his ability to enact a favorable environment. This means that, for the 
decision maker, ambiguity represents the opportunity for a favorable interpretation of the 
decision context and, consequently, for committing himself to the construction of an 
environment consistent to such belief. Borrowing this alternative approach to rationality from 
the critics to decisions of March (1997, 1999), and the sensemaking approach of Weick 
(1979, 1995), our hypothesis is that, in ambiguous situations, sunk cost affected evaluations 
represent a way to hypothesize a “possible world” consistent to the only certain “thing” the 
decider can handle to: past decisions. Moreover, we propose that escalating commitment 
represents a way for the decision maker to commit himself to the “construction” of such 
possible world. As a matter of fact, we propose that sunk cost affected decisions cannot be 
normatively defined as irrational in ambiguous environments. On the other hand we agree 
with those that define retrospective reasoning as a proper form of rationality in which 
consistency between actions and preferences is maintained, but the direction of such relation 
is inverted; that is, preferences may normatively adapt to actions. 
 
Ambiguous Decision Contexts 
 
Ambiguous situations are those in which there is a lack of meaning since there is no 
sufficient information in order to formulate a unique frame according to which events can be 
interpreted and probabilities formulated (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1972; March & Olsen, 
1976; Hatch, 1997). As a consequence, a decision maker can formulate alternative and even 
conflicting frames and, according to these, information can be interpreted in different and 
plausible ways (Gioia & Chittipetti, 1991). For instance, if there is either an impossibility to 
establish a unique judgment standard to compare consequences, or cause-effect relationships 
are not so clear, different interpretations of the data are then available (Levine 1985; Martin, 
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1992). In this case, the consideration of an alternative and a consequence as “bad” or “good” 
depends on the adopted interpretation frame. Indeed, if facts and feedbacks can be read in 
different ways, there is no rational choice implied by the characteristics of the situation since 
these are compatible with more and even conflicting options. As a consequence, an 
apparently clear situation (from an a-posteriori and external perspective) can display a-priori 
more than one possible interpretation and, therefore, more than a single future scenario can be 
pursued. 
It is important to highlight that ambiguity can be intended according to two different 
epistemological and ontological views. As said by Weick (1995, p. 95): “Although the word 
ambiguity also means the presence of two or more interpretations, it can also mean something 
quite different, namely, a lack of clarity, which makes it quite similar to uncertainty”. On the 
one hand, it can be intended as a form of ignorance of the decision maker, which is unable to 
formulate a clear frame of reference. In such sense, ambiguity is similar to uncertainty, 
because it refers to a subjective lack of information. More precisely, is a form of uncertainty 
about the probability function, that is, “Ambiguity is uncertainty about probability, created by 
missing information that is relevant and could be known.” (Camerer &Weber, 1992, p. 330). 
This notion of ambiguity is clarified by the well known Ellsberg urn problem (Ellsberg, 
1961), in which “the information about the contents of the urns in principle exists; it is just 
not made available to the decision-maker. It is hidden information, rather than nonexistent at 
the moment of the decision.” (Dequech, 2000, p. 46).  We will refer to this notion as to the 
one of “subjective ambiguity” since is caused by the decision maker’s cognitive limitations. 
In epistemological terms, still a correct frame of reference is “written” in the decision context 
but the actor is unable to perceive it properly. As a consequence, in order to generate a 
correct decision, the actor should collect more information. 
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On the other hand, ambiguity can be intended as an objective limitation, in the sense 
that the environment is ontologically underspecified, and thus can be constructed according 
to alternative multiple interpretations1. Borrowing from Berger and Luckman’s 
constructivism (1966), and Giddens’s  structuration theory (1984), the actor is both a product 
and a producer of reality i.e. the environment constraints the agent’s behaviors while these 
are able to shape environmental constraints. Moreover, since the structure is somehow 
“malleable”, meaning can be created through its manipulation. From this perspective, 
ambiguity qualifies situations in which there are multiple plausible readings of the same 
context in the sense that each reading can implement, through action, such possible 
configuration. In economic theory, this kind of malleable environment has been qualified as 
“transmutable” (Davidson, 1996) while the related notion of ambiguity has also been called 
fundamental uncertainty (Dequech 2000, p 48): 
“These situations are essentially characterized by the possibility of creativity and 
structural change and therefore by significant indeterminacy of the future. Uncertainty 
appears here in a dynamic context, in which the passage of time is crucial. The future 
cannot be anticipated by a fully reliable probabilistic estimate because the future is yet to 
be created. In socioeconomic contexts, the future is to a considerable extent unknowable, 
because surprises may occur, both as intended and as unintended consequences of human 
action. The very decisions that would require a fully reliable probabilistic guide may 
change the socioeconomic future in an unpredictable way, and this possibility of change 
prevents such a fully reliable guide from existing.” 
 
In epistemological terms, such type of ambiguous situations are those in which 
knowing alternatives is neither a passive acquisition of information about reality 
(description), nor an idealistic production of structure (prescription), but rather an ongoing 
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interaction between the agent and the environment. From this perspective, action is a means 
to know, in the sense that through action the agent produces reality and, in turn, knowledge. 
In ontological terms, there is not an a-priori correct interpretation of the world but rather a 
continuous accomplishment of a possible coupling between a decision maker and a decisional 
context. We will refer to this notion as to the one of “objective ambiguity” which presumes 
that the environment is “malleable” and thus compatible, ex-post, with alternative and even 
conflicting interpretations.  
 
Effects of Ambiguity on Decision Making: The Sensemaking Process 
 
Since in ambiguous environments a clear interpretative frame does not exist, decisions 
under ambiguity can be seen as doubled faced processes of interpretation (the subjective 
formulation of a frame such as an evaluation criterion) and consequent selection of an 
alternative (choosing a course of action) (Weick, 2000). Moreover, ambiguity presumes that 
successful decisions are those that, because of interpretative framing and committed actions, 
were able to shape a favorable decision context: “ambiguity understood as confusion created 
by multiple meanings calls for social construction and invention.” (Weick, 1995, p. 95). As 
said by Macquarrie (1972, p.75) “We do not choose an antecedent good, but make something 
good by choosing it”. In this sense, while a decision under subjective ambiguity can be 
ideally judged, a-priori, as right or wrong since a correct interpretation is ideally available, in 
objective ambiguity decisions can be judged only ex-post. In these cases, as pointed by 
Weick, ambiguity cannot be solved through the acquisition of additional information since 
“people are unsure what question to ask and whether there even exists a problem they have to 
solve” (1995, p. 99). The same author proposes that a possible way to face and reduce 
ambiguity in decision-making is through the sensemaking process. In his words (1995, p. 99): 
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“To talk about sensemaking is to talk about reality as an ongoing accomplishment that 
takes form when people make retrospective sense of the situations in which they find 
themselves. There is a strong reflexive quality to the process. People make sense of things 
by seeing a world on which they have already imposed what they believe.” 
The starting assumption is that rationality, rather than being a process aimed at keeping 
consequences coherent to preferences is more weakly oriented towards keeping coherency 
between consequences and preferences either adapting the former to the latter or the opposite. 
On this regards, the concept of rationality is the one proposed by March of appropriateness; 
human actors are aimed at matching identities (expressed, for example, by preferences) and 
situations (such as decisional contexts), either modifying their identities or the situation they 
face (March, 1994). Similarly, Weick proposes that “People can cope with change in one of 
two ways. They can adapt to the change by weakening their commitment and changing their 
actions, or they can manipulate the change by reaffirming their commitments and 
strengthening their actions” (1995, p. 161). That is, when people face situations that interrupt 
the normal flow of significance (a fact that generates a cognitive dissonance between 
expected and manifested consequences (Festinger, 1957)), they need to re-establish 
appropriateness between their identities (preferences) and situations (consequences) 
manipulating either what they believe in, or what they see. In such sense, the concept of 
sensemaking contains two main logical moments as can be seen in figure 2: the retrospective 
process of interpretation (sense) and prospective one of enacting a new configuration of the 
environment (making). 
The first logical moment (the “sense” phase) implies that, before taking action in order 
to re-establish a correct environment, agents try to give a sense to what they have done 
seeking for plausible reasons and motivations. Such process needs to handle to some fixed 
element; as proposed by Weick, this handle is provided by the past. Through the observation 
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of the past, subjects can give an order to current events to assign them significance and, 
therefore, what decision makers see is heavily influenced by what they have previously done.  
However, the very importance of the sensemaking process goes beyond the simple 
clarification of a situation. In fact, it influences what and how data is to be considered and 
judged by the subject in order to implement future actions (Choo, 2002). In this sense, Weick 
proposes the concept of enactment to describe the way an agent alters and changes its 
environment through committed action. In particular: 
“…sense making is an active process. I say this because of the ease with which the 
phenomenon of sense making slides into other phenomena such as cognition, perception, 
and representation. The problem is that many of the images associated with these related 
phenomena are passive and imply accepting the environment as given…This passivity 
may make some sense if one thinks like a realist and views sensemaking as a problem of 
discovery. But if one thinks like a constructivist, and sees sensemaking as a problem of 
invention, then the inventor has to do something more than ponder what is there (Fondas 
& Stewart, 1994). The inventor has to put something there, or consolidate what is there, 
or poke around to see what might be there, or orchestrate some kind of agreement about 
what is there. All of this placing, consolidating, poking, and recruiting is action in the 
world. This action affects what the organization then sees” (1995, p. 162). 
 
The enactment phase implies that, once an interpretation is formulated, decision makers 
are able to enact an environment favorable to such interpretation. In epistemological terms, 
once a decision maker has chosen an interpretative frame, he can influence and manipulate 
the environment (the reality) in order to establish, a-posteriori, the truth conditions of his 
beliefs (i.e. the so called self fulfilled prophecy). In fact, “once people choose how to justify 
the action that they choose to perform, they fix the frame within which their beliefs, actions 
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and associations will then make sense” (Weick p. 164). From this perspective, commitment, 
rather than an obstacle in taking rational decisions, “focuses the social construction of reality 
on those actions that are high in choice, visibility and irrevocability… the meaning of the 
action thus becomes whatever justifications survive this editing process and become attached 
to the action” (p. 162). 
 
Ambiguity, Sensemaking and Sunk Costs 
 
As said, ambiguous situations are those that are compatible with alternative 
interpretations of the future. Moreover, we assumed that rationality, in the sense proposed by 
March, aims at keeping coherency between what the agents is (the identity) and what the 
environment requires him to be (the situation). On the other hand, both Weick and March 
underline how the identity of the agent is fundamentally rooted in the past; that is, the agent’s 
identity is built around what the agent did (his decisions) and, moreover, what the agent can 
do (the capabilities that he acquired through his decisions2) (Wenger, 1998). For example, an 
agent that profuse an effort in order to obtain a taxi license, will build his identity around that 
decision and, moreover, around his capability to drive a taxi. What here needs to be 
emphasized is that such retrospective process of identity construction as a justification of past 
decisions will consider, more seemingly, those past decisions characterized by some degree 
of irreversibility. That is, the more a decision produces irreversible effects, the more the agent 
has a reason to build his identity around such decision; as said, such possibility is ensured by 
ambiguity since the future is compatible with different identities. On the contrary, both if the 
future is not ambiguous and decisions are reversible, than the agent will have no reason to 
build his identity around the past since a given world will tell him what he should be and each 
decision can be instantly reformulated. In this sense, justifications generated by means of 
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sensemaking will not be draped around any past decision, but rather around those decisions 
that display some degree of irreversibility (the action cannot be undone). Said differently, 
when producing some sense of an ambiguous world the agent will do so adopting, as a 
handle, past irreversibilities. In fact, as noted by Kiesler (1971), “once a behavior is frozen, 
cognition in the form of justification is draped around”. Such statement offers an intriguing 
link among the sensemaking theory and studies on the sunk cost effect. As a matter of fact, 
the latter provides an economic reading to the former since it systematically studies how past 
irrevesibilities influence current interpretations. On the other hand, the former provides, as 
we propose in this article, a less reductionist perspective in order to explain why people are 
so frequently influenced by the past.  
In this work, we propose to read sunk cost affected reasoning as the economic 
counterpart of the sensemaking process. In particular, from the perspective of the “sensing” 
process, it seems reasonable on the one hand to view sunk costs as the “handle” to which 
actors can refer to when making sense of decisional contexts, while, on the other, to read 
sunk cost affected reasoning as the economic dimension that motivates the cognitive 
retrospective sensemaking process. In short, if alternative interpretations can be formulated, 
is not unreasonable to formulate the most convenient one; that is, an interpretation that 
provides a reason to reuse irreversible past investments. 
From the perspective of the “making” process, if we transpose such concepts to the 
sunk cost theory, commitment of additional resources can be seen as the way in which actors 
tend to actively shape their decisional context, and the so called irrational escalation provides 
an economic motivation to the cognitive process through which decision makers bound 
themselves to such construction. In this sense, as clearly stated by Bowen (1987, p. 58): 
“…decision makers will continue to invest in courses of action beyond the point where 
others, having enacted a different reality with possibly different decision standards, 
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believe prudent. It is also understandable that resources may be reinvested in a course of 
action, assuming some degree of commitment to that course of action, because of the 
equivocality inherent in the situation and not because of an over-commitment to a failed 
investment”. 
In sum, we propose that, when facing ambiguity, decision makers will implement a 
double faced cognitive strategy motivated by, symmetrically, a double faced economic 
evaluation driven by “irreversibilities”: at first, they adopt a sunk cost affected reasoning 
mode in order to generate a plausible interpretation of the decisional context (sense phase), 
and, in a second moment, they escalate their commitment in order to enact consequences 
consistent to such evaluation (making phase). That is, they seek for a convenient explanation 
of their current irreversibilities and, consequently, commit additional irreversibilities in order 
to “fix” such explanation in the world. As we will se afterwards, we call this attitude as 
“constructive rationality”. Figure 3 shows the strong relationship we envision between sunk 
cost affected behaviors and the sensemaking approach. As a corollary, the more a situation is 
ambiguous (and has a degree of manipulability) the more a decision maker has the 
“opportunity” to implement such double faced strategy. That is why we expect, as showed in 
our experiments, that the higher the ambiguity of the decisional context, the more people will 
escalate and, on the contrary, non ambiguous situations will lead, from a classic perspective, 
to perfectly rational choices. In the next paragraph we provide some experimental data in 
order to sustain such argument. 
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The Experiment 
 
As said in the introduction, previous researches on the sunk cost effect were made to 
demonstrate that investments in money, effort or time influence decisions in a negative 
manner. In order to reject this evaluation we made an investigation to validate the argument 
by which decision makers are influenced by sunk costs because of the ambiguity intrinsic to 
the decision context rather than because they are irrational. In this sense, we produced five 
decision making scenarios characterized by increasing levels of ambiguity i.e. displaying 
situation contexts that are increasingly readable according to different interpretative frames. 
Main Hypothesis 
Our research hypothesis is that, in decision situations where a negative feedback (a 
dissonance) occurs, decision makers will be willing to invest additional resources (they 
would escalate) the more a situation enables higher margins to reinterpret the feedback in a 
way that is consistent with the reuse of past investments. On the contrary, when interpretative 
spaces are reduced, people tend to be rational in the traditional sense, that is, they tend to 
choose considering only future costs and benefits. Consequently, we expect that in non 
ambiguous situations the negative feedback will not imply the commitment of additional 
resources (decision makers will not escalate). 
 
Main Assumption 
 
In order to measure the level of ambiguity of a decision context, we assumed that a 
situation is ambiguous the more it can be red according to different interpretative frames. 
That is, the more a decision context is compatible with alternative future scenarios, the more 
is ambiguous. Such assumption is coherent with the theoretical perspective here adopted, i.e. 
Irrational Perseverant or Unrecoverable Optimist? 17 
the sense making approach. More in detail, each scenario was judged more or less ambiguous 
if respondents that continued motivated persistence referring to configurations of the future 
that where both different from the one implied by the negative feedback, and compatible with 
the reutilization of the sunk cost. In this sense, examples of qualitative responses given by 
students where: “I can shift the use of the investment for other purposes such as …” or “I 
have the opportunity to emphasize other important characteristics of the investment rather 
than only those presented in the question”. A scenario was judged less ambiguous if those 
who decided to continue motivated persistence on the base of merely retrospective 
arguments. Examples in this sense where: “I have already spent a lot of money”, “It is a 
waste to stop the investment since it is almost finished”, “I bet my face on the investment”. 
 
Evaluation of the Responses 
 
According to the above assumption we first formulated different decision scenarios that 
where intuitively characterized by an increasing level of interpretability. Afterwards, in order 
to test such graduation and analyze the driving force behind the willingness to continue, we 
measured the level of ambiguity using the qualitative responses provided by students. In 
particular: 
• the more respondents motivated the continuation because they envisioned at least a future 
scenario in which they could correctly reuse their past investment, the more we 
considered the question and thus the scenario as ambiguous. Furthermore, we classified 
these kind of respondents as constructively rational (CR), since continuation was 
motivated by a manipulative commitment to expect or enact a favorable future state of the 
world; 
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• on the contrary, the more respondents motivated continuation on the base of purely 
retrospective motivations, the more the scenario was considered less ambiguous. In 
addition, these kind of respondents where considered as irrational (IRR) since their 
responses where motivated on the base of merely retrospective motivations (e.g. don’t 
waste rule, justification, mental accounting, etc.). 
 
Materials 
 
In order to analyze the “element” ambiguity we intuitively altered the same decision 
schema according to five different investment scenarios characterized by increasing levels of 
interpretability. As schema, we adopted the well-known question n. 3A proposed by Arkes e 
Blumer (1985): 
“As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the 
company's money into a research project. The purpose was to develop a plane that would 
not be detected by conventional radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the 
project is 90% completed, another firm begins marketing a plane that cannot be detected 
by radar. Also, it is apparent that their plane is much faster and far more economical than 
the plane your company could build. The question is: should you invest the last 10% of 
the research funds to finish your radar-blank plane?” 
 
Starting from this question, we kept unchanged the four elements unanimously believed 
to be the facilitating factors in enabling sunk cost influenced decisions (Staw, 1997; Hantula 
& DeNicolis Bragger, 1999). These elements are as follows: 
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• Investment concluded for the 90% of the budget. This characteristic is considered 
fundamental in influencing current decisions. It represents the sunk cost and, at the same 
time, the completion of the investment. 
• Presence of negative feedback (a cognitive dissonance that disturbs the decision maker 
view of the word). This characteristic is fundamental because it shows that the current 
course of action is evidently unable to achieve the desired goal state (past actions are 
going to fail). It should influence the decision maker's willingness to commit further 
resources to the undertaken course of action. 
• Personal responsibility of the decision maker. This characteristic is considered strategic 
in influencing the decision maker to commit further resources in spite of negative results. 
Past experiments show that sunk cost effect is limited when a decision maker has no 
personal responsibility. 
• Opportunity to commit further resources to achieve the goal state. This condition is 
clearly necessary to show the growth of the decision maker's commitment. 
The four elements presented should define a situation in which, according to the 
traditional explanation, the sunk cost effect should uniformly influence decision-makers 
choices. That is, independently from the type of investment scenario, decision makers should 
be affected by sunk costs in a regular percentage. These factors appear unchanged in our new 
scenarios in order not to change the basic structure of the question. The five investment 
scenarios used are described below3: 
• Airplane: in this scenario the sunk cost is considered an airplane project4. A similar but 
more efficient airplane that is going to be marketed by a concurrent company represents 
the negative feedback. The decision maker should consider himself the president of the 
company. Such scenario has also been used as the test case in order to verify the 
correctness of our experimental methodology. In this sense, we expected respondents to 
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answer according to a proportion similar to the one evidenced by Arkes and Blumer i.e. 
85% of people will continue while the remaining 15% will stop. 
• Reclamation: in this scenario the sunk cost is considered the 90% concluded reclaimed 
land that will host a car-park. The negative feedback is represented by the fact that the 
objective for which the reclamation was started (the construction of a Trade Centre), will 
not occur. As for the previous question, the decision maker should consider himself as the 
president of the company. 
• Medicine: in this scenario the sunk cost is represented by the efforts used to develop a 
medicine useful to alleviate the symptoms of a disease. The negative effect is presented 
by the fact that a concurrent company is able to sale a cheaper medicine that will recover 
from the disease rather than just alleviate its symptoms. 
• Oil Excavation “150”: in this scenario the sunk cost is represented by a drilled excavation 
to find oil. The negative feedback is represented by the fact that the newly methodology 
used to find the excavation point is judged wrong by an expert of the field. Due to the 
mistake made by the methodology, the correct excavation point is evaluated 150 km far 
from the current excavation location (with no certain direction). 
• Oil Excavation “500”: this scenario is similar to the last. It differs only for the magnitude 
of the mistake generated by the methodology. Due to this mistake, the correct excavation 
point is evaluated 500 km far the current location (with no direction). Such scenario was 
also used to provide an additional evidence to our hypothesis expecting that to a 
quantitative increase of the measure of failure (500 km rather than 150) would correspond 
a quantitative de-escalation due to an increased difficulty, for respondents, to think about 
alternative future scenarios. 
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Participants 
 
Three hundred fifty three undergraduates of different faculties (Economics, Computer 
Science, Engineering and Cognitive Science) at a medium size University in Italy 
participated voluntarily in this study. Responses of two participants were excluded because 
their responses indicated that they did not understand the decision scenario. 
 
Procedure 
 
Every participant was asked to respond to a randomly assigned question. After reading 
the scenario, subjects had to sign in a two-cell box whether they want to continue or stop the 
investment. In addition, students where also asked to motivate their decision with a 
qualitative response. 
 
Results 
 
Description of the Responses 
 
Table 1 shows the results. According to our theoretical approach (i.e. the sense making 
theory), and our main assumption (i.e. constructive attitudes are correlated to ambiguity), we 
clustered the qualitative responses in two different categories in order to define constructive 
rational responses (CR) and classic irrational ones (IRR). In the scenarios Reclamation and 
Airplane almost all subjects decide to continue the investment. In fact, the 94% and 86% 
respectively are influenced by the sunk cost effect. 
Irrational Perseverant or Unrecoverable Optimist? 22 
The analysis of qualitative responses is the following: the 94% of Reclamation that 
decide to continue, can be split in a 86,9% of people who decide to continue adducting a wide 
range of plausible scenarios in which to continue the investment is rational. For instance, in 
this scenario some qualitative response were: “The reclamation of a ground is usefully 
reusable for other functions” or “The fact that the Trade Centre will not be built any longer is 
not necessarily a trouble; in fact in the same place it can be built an hospital or something 
similar that needs a car-park”. The remaining 7,1% continue the investment adducting an 
irrational explanation. 
In the Airplane scenario, the 86% of people that continue can be split in a 75,4% of 
individuals that continue due to rational responses. In fact, some interesting qualitative 
responses about this scenario were:  “I can propose my airplane highlighting its better 
invisibility and giving less importance to the velocity and economical quality as essential 
features.” or “Having more information about the concurrent airplane I can use the remaining 
10% of the budget in a way that better differentiates my airplane.”. 10,5% are considered 
irrational since they simply decided to finish the investment using an irrational explanation. 
In the scenario Medicine, among the 60,8% of who decided to continue, the 52,6% uses 
a rational explanation (they want to differentiate the product, i.e. affirm that the investment is 
usefully reusable for other researches, or that that it is possible to improve and differentiate 
the product. For instance some interesting responses were: “I want to continue the investment 
because the medicine could be useful for other diseases” or “The research allows the 
opportunity to find other applications or results for our medicine”. 8,2% is considered 
irrational because those people simply decided to finish the investment motivating that they 
already spent resources in their course of action. 
The last two scenarios, Archeological Excavation 500 and Oil Excavation 500, show 
the greater portion of subjects that decide to stop the investment. In fact who decide to 
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continue was respectively the 37,8% and the 29,4%. Of these the 26,7% and the 19,1% 
respectively explain the choice with rational argumentations. The 11,1% and 10,3% 
respectively uses irrational argumentations. For example, some motivated continuation 
adducting “Maybe if I continue, I will find water”. Some other expects to find different 
important fuels like gas, some other, state “I can use the excavation for storing dangerous 
waste”. 
 
Measuring Ambiguity 
 
In table 1 we show, for each decisional situation, the percentage of total positive 
responses, the percentage of students that continue because they envision some future 
scenario that is compatible with their past investments (CR), and the percentage of students 
that continued on the base of merely retrospective motivations (IRR). Decision scenarios are 
ranked from the question that displayed a higher percentage of CR to the one that displays a 
lower percentage. We underline that: 
• different decision scenarios display relevant differences in terms of constructive rational 
attitudes, χ2 (1, N =319) = 102,70; p < .001. Moreover, according to our assumption, the 
different scenarios are characterized by different levels of ambiguity. 
• The percentage of students that display an irrational attitude (IRR) is constant and 
particularly low (mean = 9,5%; sd = 1,7%). The former aspect seems to confirm the 
traditional reading of sunk cost affected behaviors in the sense that, regardless the 
decision context, decision makers display a retrospective “bias”. On the other end, the 
latter aspect seems to question the relevance of such “bias” (see the discussion below). 
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Measuring Escalation 
 
Once we measured ambiguity adopting, as a parameter, a relevant differentiation of 
constructive rational (CR) attitudes, we tested our main hypotheses. That is, we expected that 
de-escalation is manifestly correlated to ambiguity in the sense that the more people escalate, 
the more there are chances to envision new plausible configurations of the decision context. 
In figure 4 we show the percentage of people that escalate (i.e. continue the investment) 
assuming as ordering criterion the level of ambiguity (from more to less ambiguous) as 
defined above. Regarding the escalation effect, we propose two main considerations. 
First, we observed that there is an evident de-escalation effect according to different 
decision scenarios. Considering the results of Arkes and Blumer experiment, approximately 
the 85% of decision makers should decide to continue the investment in all scenarios. Instead, 
it is possible to see from figure 4 that the results of our five scenarios display a dramatic 
difference in the levels of commitment. Notice how the test case value has closely the same 
value of Arkes and Blumer’s experiment (the difference is only of 1%). Comparing the test 
case (Airplane scenario) with other scenarios and except for the Reclamation scenario where 
the tendency to invest was not significantly different, χ2 (1, N=141) = 2,65; n.s., we have that 
for the Medicine the sunk cost effect is evidently lower, χ2 (1, N=154) = 10,83; p < .01. 
Finally the sunk cost effect decreases markedly for Oil Excavation 150, χ2 (1, N=102) = 
25,57; p < .001 and Oil Excavation 500,  χ2 (1, N=125) = 40,10; p < .001. 
This point, alone, cannot be explained by those that sustain that escalation is a 
maladaptive behavior which is intrinsic to the decision maker rather than to the decision 
context. In this sense, escalating behaviors should have been constant, given that the features 
of an escalating situation as defined by Arkes and Blumer are respected, regardless the object 
of the investment (see the discussion). In fact, they are all facing a situation in which the past 
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actions used to achieve the initial goal are apparently going to fail and they were not 
informed about future earnings or instructed with sunk cost principles (Heat, 1995; Tan & 
Yates, 1995).  
A second consideration is that the de-escalation curve is highly correlated to the level 
of ambiguity of the decision context in the sense proposed by the sensemaking approach, and 
according to the measurement method here adopted (see figure 5); there is a high correlation 
between positive responses and constructive rational explanations (ρ = 0,99). On the contrary, 
it’s weakly correlated to merely retrospective (irrational) attitudes (ρ = 0,26). As a 
consequence, we observe how the majority of those that continue do so not because they had 
already invested (such as according to a “don’t waste rule”) but rather because they envision 
the opportunity to pursue a different future scenario. In other words, they would propose a 
future that is different from the one implied in the original course of action, and, nonetheless, 
compatible with its maintenance. In doing so, we propose that continuation is, in general, re-
conducible not to a presumed “irrationality” of the decision maker, but rather to a 
“constructive” attitude allowed by an ambiguous decision context. On the other hand, the 
more the degree of ambiguity decreases, the more the interpretation of the negative feedback 
is troublesome in the sense that the situation can be interpreted less easily in a positive way. 
In such cases, an increasing portion of respondents manifest a rational behavior in the 
traditional sense; that is, they don’t consider the past in order to decide for the future. 
 
Discussion of the Experiment: Ambiguity and Escalation 
 
The major perspective on sunk cost states that escalation of commitment is a situation 
in which “losses have been suffered, where there is an opportunity to persist or withdraw, and 
where the consequences of these actions are uncertain” (Staw, 1997, p.192). Due to 
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psychological or material costs, subjects tend to become locked into behaviors that lead to 
“throw good money after bad money”. According to this view, a series of experiments have 
been done, and observed escalating behaviors have been judged as irrational; in fact, even in 
the face of failure, people choose to continue an ongoing project. Such judgment basically 
derives form the assumption that the decision context displays a unique and a-priori defined 
interpretative frame. As clearly said by these authors (Staw, 1997 for a review), respondents 
tend to continue even if past investment objectively should not influence the decision 
appearing in this sense evidently irrational. 
In our experiments, we have shown that escalating behaviors cannot be reduced to an 
independent feature that characterizes decision makers’ attitudes. Rather, the presence of 
escalation seems to be a function of the decisional context configuration. From this 
perspective, we have shown that by altering the object of investment and living unchanged 
the typical features of an escalating situation, the number of people that escalate pass from a 
94% to a 29,4%. Nonetheless, a constant tendency to escalate (mean=9,5%, sd=1,7%) is here 
confirmed although its relevance is heavily reduced. We believe that these findings should 
lead to the conclusion that escalating behaviors cannot be merely explained adducting a 
generalized maladaptive behavior, but rather they must be motivated taking into account, as 
proposed by a series of researches (Staw & Fox, 1977; Armstrong, Coviello & Safranek, 
1993; Drummond, 1994, 1996; Garland, Sandefur & Rogers, 1990), the particular 
configuration of the decision context. Although people display a tendency to escalate, such 
tendency doesn’t seem to represent the major motivation. 
In order to investigate such motivations, we have shown, coherently to what was 
proposed by Bowen (1987), that the presence of escalating behaviors is heavily correlated to 
the perceived ambiguity of the decision context. Adopting a sensemaking perspective 
(Weick, 2000), we assumed that ambiguous situations are those that are compatible with 
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alternative interpretative frames. As proposed by Weick and March, the more a situation is 
ambiguous, the more decision makers cannot rely on future costs and outcomes in order to 
take a rational decision. Rather, they have to look at the only certain information they have, 
the past, in order to find a “handle” able to provide some form of coherency. In escalating 
terms, in ambiguous situations the decision maker has the possibility to envision a future state 
of affairs which is favorable to his past course of action. From this perspective, we have 
shown that escalation is strongly correlated to perceived ambiguity since respondents that 
continued motivated persistence adducting the availability of alternative configurations of the 
future, being at least one of these consistent to their investment. As a consequence, previous 
experiments are to be considered as ambiguous since respondents were provided with a 
feedback that was not useful to clearly determine a-priori if investing additional resources 
would have been profitable or not (Heat, 1995; Northcraft &Wolf, 1984). This means that the 
results of those experiments do not show a presumed irrationality due to the sunk cost effect, 
but rather the wealth of meanings people can give to apparently simple situations. 
Moreover, we have shown that in non ambiguous situations, the major part of 
respondents don’t escalate while those that continue motivate persistence, for an increasing 
proportion, adducting traditionally irrational explanation. Said differently, the less a situation 
is ambiguous, the less in absolute terms people escalate while the more, in relative terms, 
they do so on the base of merely retrospective motivations (see figure 6). While the former 
observation confirms that ambiguity can be considered as the major motivation in order to 
explain escalating behaviors, the latter confirms that the constant tendency to escalate 
(observed above) is in effect a constant “bias” since motivated only by past looking 
arguments. That is, the de-escalation curve seems to be “translated”, for a constant, in favor 
of escalation, and such translation can be explained as an interpretative bias (see figure 7). 
Such argument is not coherent to Arkes and Blumer’s explanation of escalating behaviors 
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since the fallacy in viewing the past (“retrospective fallacy”) is, according to our findings, a 
minor motivation to continue. Rather, is consistent to the Prospect Theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) reading in which people, in loosing situations, tend to systematically over-
estimate the probability to recover from their losses. 
 
General Discussion: Irrational or Constructively Rational? 
 
It’s to be underlined that, according to a sensemaking approach, ambiguity can be 
referred to subjective computational limitations, but also to an objective configuration of the 
environment that can be shaped, through manipulative actions, according to alternative 
interpretations. In this sense the environment, rather than a given constant, is a malleable 
matter that can match different expectations. Such perspective provides an opportunity to 
propose some other considerations. First, an escalating behavior can be normatively seen as a 
rational decisional strategy in strong rather than in weak terms. In the latter sense, assuming 
ambiguity as ignorance, escalation is proposed as a sub optimal strategy aimed at acquiring 
additional information under uncertainty (McCain, 1986; Goltz, 1992); nonetheless, this 
perspective assumes that “there is”, in the environment, an optimal answer which cannot be 
known by the decision maker, but that can be known by an ideal omniscient external 
observer. This reading is consistent to a bounded rationality approach, in which actors, due to 
their limited computational capacity, generate decisional heuristics that minimize the need of 
information according to a criterion of satisfiability (Simon 1972, 1976). In this sense, 
looking at the past through Bayesian observations, such as in the experiments proposed by 
Goltz (1992) and formally demonstrated by O’Flaherty & Komaki (1992), is red as one of 
these possible heuristic strategies. Consequently, past looking strategies are seen as weakly 
rational since unable to produce optimal outcomes, but rather some consistency between 
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decisions and outcomes (or procedurally rational as proposed by Simon). In fact, the strong 
classic rational model would still envision an ideal decision strategy that, given a complete 
knowledge of the world, is able to achieve optimal decisions based on the evaluation of future 
costs and benefits (i.e. substantial rationality). 
On the other hand, objective ambiguity would propose past looking attitudes as 
normatively correct in a strong sense since decision makers have the opportunity to enact an 
environment that can be consistent, ex-post, with their retrospective interpretations. Such type 
of rationality is here called “constructive rationality”; as such, it proposes that decision 
makers, when facing ambiguity, could normatively adopt a sunk cost affected decision 
making process that is aimed at producing a plausible interpretation of the situation and, 
afterwards, escalate their commitment in order to implement their view “in” the world. As 
said at the beginning, accordingly to the kind of rationality proposed by March, this 
perspective may suggest that preferences may rationally adapt to actions. 
Moreover, the enacted environment can be also substantially optimal and, according to 
Weick, the possibility to achieve such optimality depends upon two conditions (Weick, 1995, 
2000). The first pertains to the actor and refers to the extent to which he’s committed to his 
interpretation; in these terms, commitment is an expression of the energy that he will put in 
order to enact it. The second pertains to the environment and refers to its malleability; in 
these terms, the more an environment is malleable, the more it can be enacted in a way that 
matches the actors’ interpretations. According to this view, we can provide some interesting 
reinterpretation of past experiments’ explanations of escalating behaviors. This list is not 
exhaustive and, of course, requires additional investigations: 
• retrospective justification is seen as one moment of the sensemaking process; as we have 
shown, respondents provide both a retrospective motivation to continuance and a 
prospective formulation of a plausible future scenario. In this sense, self-justification is 
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not a symptom of fallacy (Brockner, 1992) but rather a “handle” in order to sustain 
commitment and produce some reformulation of the decisional context; 
• the observation that commitment increases escalation is, from a sensemaking perspective, 
totally plausible. In fact, the more a decision maker is committed, the more he will 
express a manipulative energy aimed at enacting a proper environment. On the contrary, 
as it is also intuitive in real life, decision without commitment will be hardly successful; 
• incremental investments as a means to gather additional information about the 
environment (McCain, 1986) can be red as an attempt of the decision maker to test how 
“malleable” is the decision context. That is, through incremental commitments, the actor 
tests how responsive is the environment to his stimulations; 
• the escalation bias here observed, which is consistent to the Prospect Theory (Khaneman 
& Twersky, 1979), can be red as an overgeneralization of a “constructive rule” rather than 
a “don’t waste rule”. That is, if decision makers experience successful decisions based on 
sensemaking processes, they could over-estimate their constructive/manipulative capacity 
and tend to rely on retrospective evaluations. 
Notice that one of the first research articles of the sunk cost effect, the article of Arkes 
and Blumer, gives a chance to reinforce our enactment interpretation. In fact, they concluded 
the article proposing this story (1985, p. 139): 
“… one person who recognized it as an error was none other than Thomas A. Edison. In 
the 1880s Edison was not making much money on his great invention, the electric lamp. 
The problem was that his manufacturing plant was not operating at full capacity because 
he could not sell enough of his lamps. He then got the idea to boost his plant's production 
to full capacity and sell each extra lamp below its total cost of production. His associates 
thought this was an exceedingly poor idea, but Edison did it anyway. By increasing his 
plant's output, Edison would add only 2% to the cost of production while increasing 
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production 25%. Edison was able to do this because so much of the manufacturing cost 
was sunk cost. It would be present whether or not he manufactured more bulbs. Edison 
than sold the large number of extra lamps in Europe for much more than the small added 
manufacturing costs. Since production increases involved negligible new costs but 
substantial new income, Edison was wise to increase production. While Edison was able 
to place sunk costs in proper perspective in arriving at his decision, our research suggests 
that most of the rest of us find that very difficult to do.” 
 
Interestingly, Arkes and Blumer conclusion presents the characteristics of the 
“retrospective fallacy” (Bowen & Power, 1993) since their analysis is based on the results 
appeared at the end of the entire story (it is obvious now that Edison was right, we all use 
electric lamps). The judgment given by Arkes and Blumer to the Edison's activity is 
obviously based on today’s sin (consequences) rather than through the eyes of yesterday5 
(possible forecasts). In particular, the sentence “… Edison was able to place sunk costs in 
proper perspective in arriving at his decision” gives us the chance to have some doubts about 
the negative judgment given to the results of past sunk cost effect experiments and, in 
general, to the behaviors of people in ambiguous situations. Such critic is quite similar to the 
one proposed by Karl Weick to Merton’s argument on retrospective fallacy. We believe that 
both perspectives position very effectively the issue of escalating behaviors in the proper 
frame; that is, a more general discussion around the nature of rationality which, in turn, is 
rooted in a fundamental epistemological debate around the constructive nature of knowledge. 
On the one hand, Robert Merton clearly represents the position of those that view escalation 
as irrational and, in turn, knowledge as a given matter; on the other, Karl Weick represents 
the position, here adopted, that envisions sunk costs affected behaviors as an expression of a 
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different form of rationality, and knowledge as a constructed matter. For this reason we live 
to their arguments the conclusion of our discussion.  
Robert Merton (from Weick 95, p. 147): 
“The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false definition of the situation 
evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false conception come true. The 
specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetuates a reign of error. For the 
prophet will cite the actual course of events as proof that he was right from the beginning. 
Such are the perversities of social logic”. 
 
Karl Weick (1995, p. 147): 
“What Merton has described is a means to create sense, although it looks to be inaccurate 
sense. But look again. When a self-fulfilling prophecy is said to begin with a “false 
definition”, the question arises, false in whose view? And relative to what goals? The 
definition is said to be a false rendering of “the” situation, as if there were only one way 
the situation could be read. Multiple realities and over-determination apparently have no 
place here.  The evoking of a “new behavior” in response to the false prophecy alters the 
situation, but not simply with respect to the prophecy. … Merton treats the original 
prophecy as if it had only one meaning, which is contrary to the more likely possibility 
that all prophecies represent “unfinished business” capable of different readings. The 
achieved validity is said to be “suspicious”, but in fact, one could argue validity is 
validity. If the situation has been altered, and if it is read in light of the original prophecy, 
then the reading is accurate, no matter how that accuracy was accomplished. What is 
unleashed is not so much a reign of error as a new set of organized cues that accuracy was 
accomplished. This may qualify as “perverse social logic.” But if a person goes through 
these motions and continues to interact with the target in natural situations, amid other 
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group members who see things differently and say so, then these sensemaking operations 
have reduced uncertainty and enabled people to construct meaning.” 
 
Conclusions 
 
The question of whether the stories of sunk cost influenced behaviors are stories of 
“perseverant irrationality” or “unrecoverable optimism”, can find an answer if we view the 
“problem” of sunk cost affected reasoning from the enactment perspective, and thus consider 
ambiguity and constructability of the environment as an opportunity to establish an 
alternative form of rationality, here called “constructive rationality” (Ponte & Bonifacio, 
2004). In particular, we refer to a reasoning process that roots in the past (sunk costs) a 
handle to produce sense of an ambiguous situation, and enacts an appropriate future through a 
manipulative form of commitment (escalation). Such reading has been theoretically proposed 
by Bowen but no experiment has been done in order to provide a clear cut in favor of such 
constructivist perspective; that is, ambiguity represents a decisional opportunity that 
normatively legitimates sunk cost affected behaviors. Our work aims both at proposing 
experimental data consistent to this view, and, moreover, at extending Bowen’s proposal 
making more clear how it engenders the economic foundation of an alternative and normative 
rational model. 
In order to sustain our argument we did a set of initial experiments aimed at showing 
how, by altering the level of ambiguity of the decision context, escalation of commitment 
dramatically changes. Such change reaches a point in which the proportion between 
escalating (supposedly irrational) and non-escalating (supposedly rational) decision makers is 
inverted. Moreover, the variation of escalating behaviors is evidently correlated to the 
possibility for respondents to adopt a “constructive” rather than a merely retrospective 
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attitude. These preliminary results may not provide full evidence to our constructivist 
explanation of such inversion. Nonetheless we believe that they cannot be explained by the 
traditional sunk cost theories. In such terms, we propose on the one hand, our experiments as 
a strong, and hopefully conclusive, counter argument to the reductionism implied by the 
“irrational” school of thought and, on the other, our explanation as a plausible interpretation 
of a so common and often innovative decision attitude. Such attitude shows decision makers 
as creative thinkers rather than reactively adapting to a given destiny, able to get a success 
out of their failures rather than withdrawing when facing odds, and willing to overcome those 
impossibilities that are so often accepted by ordinary thinking and common sense. From this 
perspective, we prefer to view sunk cost affected reasoning as a symptom of a “constructive” 
form of rationality, or, said differently, as a manifestation of “unrecoverable optimism” rather 
than “perseverant irrationality”. 
 
Open Issues and Future Work 
 
In order to prove and move forward this perspective, more theoretical and experimental 
work should be done. From the latter perspective, experiments should be carried in order to 
give more quantitative, rather than qualitative, evidence of how ambiguity is related to 
escalation, proving that escalating behaviors are sustained by the belief that multiple 
implementation scenarios are possible. Moreover, it would be interesting to test how, given 
an ambiguous decision context, people that escalate tend to be particularly proactive in 
manipulating their social and physical environments in order to establish the truth conditions 
of their beliefs. 
In theoretical terms, the enactment perspective offers the possibility to heavily 
reposition sunk cost research as a protagonist in the field of epistemology by contributing 
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with a whole set of concepts to the study of how people make sense of situations, negotiate 
meaning, and construct new realities. From this perspective, sunk cost affected behaviors can 
be more widely studied as the economic foundation of a constructivist approach to 
interpretative processes. First, they may give an economic account of how people, when 
facing ambiguity, tend to adopt a confirmative (retrospective) rather than falsificative 
(prospective) reasoning attitude (Latour, 1988). Second, escalation can be viewed as the 
economic “engine” that sustains and enable the creation and stabilization of meaning. That is, 
through escalation, people intentionally bound themselves to such confirmative reasoning 
attitude that tends to assume, rather than prove, the truth value of their beliefs. In this sense, 
escalation could provide an economic account of how people tend to “reify” meanings in the 
“world” by intentionally “locking-in” themselves and the others in those interpretations that 
where once cognitively and socially produced. 
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Appendix: The five scenarios 
 
Airplane 
As the president of an airline company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the 
company's money into a research project. The purpose was to develop a plane that would not 
be detected by conventional radar, in other words, a radar-blank plane. When the project is 
90% completed, another firm begins marketing a plane that cannot be detected by radar. 
Also, it is apparent that their plane is much faster and far more economical than the plane 
your company could build. 
The question is: should you invest the last 10% of the research funds to finish your radar-
blank plane? 
Medicine 
As the president of a pharmaceutical company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the 
company's money into a research project. The purpose was to develop a medicine that would 
alleviate the symptom of a disease. When the project is 90% completed, another firm begins 
marketing a vaccine that recovers from the disease. Also, it is apparent that their vaccine is 
more effective and less expensive than the medicine your company is developing. 
The question is: should you invest the last 10% of your research funds to finish your 
medicine? 
Reclamation 
As the president of a land renovation company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the 
company's money into a construction project. The purpose was to reclaim a land that will be 
used as a car-park since in its close proximity a trade center will be constructed. When the 
project is 90% completed, you being acknowledge that the project of the trade center has 
been abandoned. 
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The question is: should you invest the last 10% of the reclamation funds to finish your car-
par? 
Oil excavation “150” 
As the president of an excavations company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the 
company’s money into an excavation project. The purpose was to find oil in the Sahara 
Desert. The point in which to excavate was found using a sophisticated satellite-network 
based system. When the project is 90% completed, a famous geologist published some data 
stating that your method to find the point is subject to a calculation error. This error gives an 
excavation point that is 150 kilometer far from the right place. Also, it is apparent that the 
data of the geologist are correct and valid and your engineers agree with them. 
The question is: should you invest the last 10% of the excavation funds to finish your 
excavation? 
Oil Excavation “500” 
As the president of an excavations company, you have invested 10 million dollars of the 
company's money into an excavation project. The purpose was to find oil in the Sahara 
Desert. The point in which to excavate was found using a sophisticated satellite-network 
based system. When the project is 90% completed, a famous geologist published some data 
stating that your method to find the point is subject to a calculation error. This error gives an 
excavation point that is 500 kilometer far from the right place. Also, it is apparent that the 
data of the geologist are correct and valid and your engineers agree with them. 
The question is: should you invest the last 10% of the excavation funds to finish your 
excavation? 
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Footnotes 
 
1
 “Ambiguity refers to features of decision making in which alternative states are hazily 
defined or in which they have multiple meanings, simultaneously opposing interpretations. 
Students of ambiguity argue that information may not resolve misunderstandings of the 
world; that the “real” world may itself be a product of social construction, thus not so much 
discovered as invented; that interpretations of experience and desires may be fundamentally 
ambivalent rather than simply uncertain; and that ambiguity may be used to augment 
understanding through imagination.” (March, 1994). 
2
 As Wenger clearly defines: “We define who we are by where we have been and where 
we are going. Identity is not some primordial core of personality that already exists. (…) It 
has coherence through time that connects the past, the present, and the future. (…) As 
trajectories, our identities incorporate the past and the future in the very process of 
negotiating the present.” (Wenger, 1998, pp. 149-154). 
3
 In the Appendix it is possible to view the five questions. 
4
 This scenario is the same used by Arkes and Blumer (1985). 
5
 As proposed by Hantula and De Nicolis Bragger this analysis is “predicated on post-hoc 
analysis that focused on the primacy of hindsight over foresight and can be considered a 
retrospective fallacy.” (1999, p. 426). 
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Figures and Tables Captions 
 
Table 1. Results obtained in each scenario. Positive responses are split in constructive 
rational and irrational explanations. 
 
Figure 1. Sunk cost effect and irrational escalation. 
Figure 2. The sensemaking process. 
Figure 3. Commonalities between sunk cost effect and sensemaking. 
Figure 4. Percentage of the positive responses in the five scenarios. 
Figure 5. V Results of the five scenarios with indication of constructive rational and 
irrational explanations. 
Figure 6. Within positive responses, percentage of constructive rational and irrational 
responses. 
Figure 7. Results of the five scenarios with indication of constructive rational and irrational 
explanations. 
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Table 1: Results obtained in each scenario. Positive responses are split in constructive 
rational and irrational explanations 
 
 RECLAMATION AIRPLANE MEDICINE OIL EX. 150 OIL EX. 500 
YES 
94% 
(79) 
86% 
(49) 
60,8%  
(59) 
37,8%  
(17) 
29,4%  
(20) 
CONSTRUCTIVE 
RATIONAL (CR) 86,9% 75,4% 52,6% 26,7% 19,1% 
 
IRRATIONAL 
(IRR) 7,1% 10,5% 8,2% 11,1% 10,3% 
NO 
6% 
(5) 
14% 
(8) 
39,2%  
(38) 
62,2%  
(28) 
70,6%  
(48) 
χ
2
 (1, N=351) = 93,80; p < .001 
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Figure 1: Sunk cost effect and irrational escalation
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Figure 2: The sensemaking process
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effect and sensemaking 
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Figure 5: Results of the five scenarios with indication of 
constructive rational and irrational explanations
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constructive rational and irrational responses
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